

A Review of Chapters 3 and 4, Mexican American Heritage

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Summary of Important concerns:

- Mexican and Mexican American women are absent from the narrative.
- Mexican American men are largely absent from the narrative.
- With exception of Stephen Austin's colony, the authors ignore the very important history of the empresarios in Texas, including the Martin De Leon Colony.
- The author's command of Texas history in the Mexican era (a key component of any Mexican American Studies textbook) is notably poor and generally absent the voices of prominent Tejanos.
- The author's understanding of the Texas Revolution is exceedingly poor and is a disservice to both Anglo and Mexican sensibilities
- Many important points of discussion get at best a backhanded acknowledgement from the authors.
- Only 5 citations (all online sources) that are relevant to the Texas Revolution.
- Only the last section of Chapter 4 dealing with the Mexican American War has any potential to be modified and be made useful.

Evaluation of Chapter 3 and 4

I evaluated Chapters 3 and 4, which deal with the period of Mexican Independence up until the Mexican American War. Before discussing the chapters, the first item that needs to be addressed is the inability of the authors to focus upon the subject at hand. While the text is supposed to be an examination of Mexican American history, the authors are apparently unaware that Peruvians, Cubans, Argentinians and Colombians (while Latinos) are not Mexicans. Mexicans are their own people, and while they share many attributes with the other nations of Latin America (like a common language and imperial connection to Spain), Mexicans and their history are no more interchangeable with other Latin American nations than Irish and Australian history are to each other. Mexico's history with the United States is quite unique and dominated by four very important factors: the first is that war and direct conquest of large swaths of territory bind the last 200 years of history between Mexico and the United States in a way that is incomparable to the rest of Latin America; second, as a result of both that conquest (which included over 50,000 Mexican citizens who were suddenly United States citizens) and subsequent immigration, people of Mexican descent compose by far the majority of people of Latino extraction in the United States; third, Mexico is the only Latin American nation that shares a land border with the United States. While politics may deem either side of that 2,000-mile border one country or another, the

reality of human culture and customs creates its own reality. Finally, a book on Mexican American Studies naturally requires a strong focus on Mexican history, especially in the early stages before the Texas Revolution and the Mexican-American War, because Mexican-American history starts in the parts of the United States that once belonged to Mexico. The post Mexican-American War era also requires a continued focus on Mexican history, because the evolution of that nation (its development as a nation and its problems) naturally affected events in the United States in the regions abutting the two nations. This is why, before critiquing the specific content of the text, it is important to qualify that the main objection to this text is derived from the impression that the authors are fundamentally ignorant of the subject they purport to examine, evaluate and package for a textbook. In short, the authors certainly do not understand the MEXICAN part of Mexican American Studies.

Chapter 3

The first problem is that early in Chapter 3, the authors are discussing the decline of the Spanish Empire (and its connection to Mexican Independence), but their failure to adequately address the Caste System in their previous chapter removes one of the most important causal elements from the discussion. Without a solid understanding of the effects that the caste system had on New Spain's society and the subsequent resentments it engendered between groups, it minimizes the ability of the students to understand the social dynamics and political alignments that arose before and during (as well after) the Independence movement. The events leading up to the Grito de Dolores (the beginning of the War of Mexican Independence) are treated superficially, and the description of the fall of the Alhondiga uses language designed deliberately to prejudice the reader against the Independence movement. The selection of certain words like "massacre" and "sacking" to describe the actions of the Independence army are designed to deliberately prejudice the reader against those involved in the Independence movement. Such words underscore the author's belief in the illegitimacy of the protagonist and their cause, especially since they do not use similar language in describing the actions of the Monarchist forces (who were equally cruel in their actions). The authors' knowledge of historical geography is suspect as the Noria de Bajan, Coahuila, (the place where Miguel Hidalgo, the initial leader of the Independence movement was betrayed and captured) was located 600 miles from the U.S./ Mexico Border in 1811, hardly what anyone would refer to as "near" the border as the author claims. They dedicate all of one short paragraph to the Morelos phase of the war, which is astounding. Jose Maria Morelos took over the leadership of the Independence movement after the death of Hidalgo and is both one of the best military leaders of that war and arguably its most important intellectual. It was during his phase, that the Mexican Congress begins to take form and the philosophical underpinnings of Mexican Independence are articulated (in strong measure by Morelos himself). Dedicating one short paragraph to this era is as absurd as casually mentioning there was a Continental Congress in 1776 and then moving on to Yorktown. The authors do not even examine how the fall of Napoleon (and liberation of Spain from the French) negatively affected the independence movement in Latin America. They do cherry pick one of

Morelos's documents designed to curb infighting at the early stages of the independence movement that provides an erroneous philosophical image of Morelos. Characterizing the insurgency from 1815-1821 as a series of crimes appears to be deliberately designed to prejudice the reader against the people leading the insurgent forces and by extension, the idea of Mexican Independence. There was considerable insurgent activity in Texas, especially the Gutierrez/McGee expedition and the activities of Dr. James Long. These are completely missing from the narrative and are quite important as they are important precursors to understanding the future relations between the US and Mexico in that region, as well as the bonds the Texas borderlands had with encroaching American frontier. The authors fail to mention what was happening in places like New Mexico and California during the War of Independence. This exclusion is inexcusable as it ignores the effect that the War of Independence had upon the largest Mexican population in the region (45,000) that would one day form part of the United States. This includes the emergent trade routes between Santa Fe and the Western United States. The authors also do not understand the relationship and history between Spanish Liberals and the Spanish monarchy and how that affected the independence movements in Mexico and the rest of Latin America. The first effort at forming a constitutional monarchy in Spain took place in 1812, and was originally designed to include participation from Latin American representatives. King Ferdinand VII was unwilling to compromise or curb his power and that effort as well as the one in 1820, failed. Finally the conclusion of Mexican Independence was clumsily written, and fails to mention the central role of Juan O'Donojou (the last Spanish viceroy) in helping consolidate Mexican Independence.

Authors continue to demonstrate a poor grasp or appreciation of geography. They fail to illustrate the full territorial extent of the new nation of Mexico in 1821. In addition, the author makes a claim that when the territories of Central America broke away from Mexico in 1823 to form their own nation, Mexico lost one third of its territory. In 1823, Central America accounted for 9% (176,000 sq mi) of total Mexican land (1,960,000 sq mi) or 1/11th.... Hardly 1/3rd. The author makes a further mistake in another part of the text suggesting that Central America broke away from Mexico in 1838. Considering that the first decade of Mexican independence (especially the presidency of Guadalupe Victoria) is very important for understanding much of the next 4 decades of Mexican history, not to mention the very important event that led to the Texas Revolution and the Mexican American War, this section is shamefully thin and bereft of analysis. The author obviously does not understand that the increasingly poisoned relationship between Centralists and Federalists affected the ability of the Mexican nation to develop an effective government, which in turn negatively affected the borderlands. The United States had a hand in this political infighting (whether intentional or not), as the first United States representative in Mexico, Joel Roberts Poinsett played a leading role in organizing one of the factions for the benefit of American policy aims. The United States was certainly quite active, diplomatically speaking, in their relations with Mexico and were seeking to acquire Texas from Mexico, another undisputed fact that the authors sidestep. It is interesting that the authors exclude the Adams-Onis Treaty from discussion as it is very relevant to events that will poison

the relationship between the US and Mexico in terms of Texas. I assume this is supposed to be a high school level book, but the information, as it is presented here, would be barely adequate for a 4th-grade textbook. I mean one questions whether the writers really know anything about the subject they purport to teach. The final four pages of Chapter 3 Section 1 are useless, as they have no bearing upon Mexican American issues.

Section 2: Pages 126-136 present the author's very jaundiced philosophical interpretation of the formation of the United States in an effort to compare it to Mexico's post-revolutionary formation. Much of the history, should have been discussed in Chapter 2 and then referenced in Chapter 3, but even then, the amount of page space dedicated for this purpose (when other more relevant topics are minimized or excluded) serves little purpose. Two interesting notes on page 137 and 138. The author uses the word "dictator" when in actuality they meant to use something akin to caudillo or strongman. A person can only become a dictator once they are in power, not before. Thus a military or political leader can oust a sitting president and once they are in power they can become a dictator. While there were plenty of people of French descent living in Quebec, that region had been out of French control since 1763. Considering the British (who controlled Quebec) would likely have put a stop to any French monkey business from that quarter, how exactly is the French presence in that region consequential to the discussion? The authors continue to be inexact in their use of language by claiming that Spain freed Mexico in 1836. There is a difference between the year that Spain finally recognized Mexican Independence, and that fact that Mexico had already been free from Spain since 1821. The rest of the chapter, from pg. 142-145 offers a salvageable summary of Mexican views on American intentions, but without greater details of American diplomacy during that era, the discussion lacks the necessary context. Section 2 spends so little page time on the relevant history to the topic that is of little use.

Chapter 4

Section 1 of this chapter begins with a blatant inaccuracy concerning northern New Spain. The authors claim that the Spanish did not settle their northern frontier well, blatantly ignoring that northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado had stable and thriving communities of decent size by 1800. By that year, Northern New Mexico had 20,000 settlers of Spanish descent with a further 10,000 Christianized Pueblo. By comparison, in the same year, the territories of Alabama, Indiana and Mississippi combined had 4,000 less European settlers. The authors further claim that the Spanish army did not defend the border. This coupled with a one-dimensional focus on the mission system in California (while ignoring similar initiatives in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona) underscores either the author's historical ignorance or a deliberate omission. Are they not aware that the origin of cities and towns like Tucson, San Antonio, El Paso, Santa Fe and Nacogdoches are the result of the establishment of missions? Are they also not aware about the establishment of a defensive line of presidios to defend these frontier communities? There were

multiple initiatives by the Spanish government to settle the frontier and to maintain peace between these communities and the Native American tribes with whom they came into contact. This included establishing missions to Hispanicize the local tribes, material inducements and military action (for instance, they can examine Hugo Oconor's campaigns against the Apache in the 1770's). While the war of Mexican Independence greatly affected security in this region, the author's statement is just ignorant.

One would think that most of this chapter would focus on Texas history during the Mexican era, as that would become the flashpoint of the events that would lead to the United States to acquire large chunks of Mexico. The reader is quickly disappointed by the author's extremely poor understanding and knowledge of Texas history. At the forefront, one would expect a long discussion on the colonization of Texas and the development of the empresario system. While Moses Austin is mentioned, there is little discussion of the process or details by which Austin obtained the contract from the Spanish authorities to establish a colony in Texas. In addition, the author is unaware that Moses Austin died in 1821 and that his son, Stephen Austin had to renegotiate his colonization contract with the Mexican authorities (on page 151 the author stated that Moses Austin received his colonization contract in 1822 and that one year later he passed it to his son... fairly active work for a two year old corpse). This is the extent of the discussion of the empresarios (a fairly important piece of history) punctuated by the line that only one new colonist came from Mexico. I can only assume that the author is referring to Martin De Leon, but apparently they were not aware that he established the successful De Leon Colony, which included 41 Mexican families and led to the founding of Victoria, Texas. The authors also do not mention the other empresarios like Green DeWitt and Haden Edwards, who also played important roles in the region. The author fails to note that the Mexican government had a notable problem with large numbers of illegal squatters from the United States coming into Texas and also fails to note that many of the legal settlers from the United States did not respect the terms of their settlement contracts, which expected them to embrace Catholicism, learn Spanish and become Mexican citizens (in page 155 the author incorrectly noted that Anglo American settlers were respectful of these requirements, which is a blatant inaccuracy). The Fredonia Rebellion and its fallout is absent as well as its role in prompting General Manuel Mier y Teran's inspection tour of Texas in 1828. The results of Mier y Teran's inspection tour prompted passage of the Law of April 6, 1830, which restricted the further immigration of US citizens into Texas.

At this point, it would have made sense for the author to focus on the political turmoil in Mexico at the end of President Guadalupe Victoria's term of office. This turmoil, and some of its most important players, like Lorenzo de Zavala and Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna are an important part of the causal factors that lead to the Texas Revolution. The abolishment of slavery in Mexico in 1829 and its subsequent handling in terms of Texas required more than one throw-away line, as it is also an important causal element in the events leading to the Texas Revolution. Authors mention the Velasco revolt but fail to connect the event as part of the greater revolt that

took place in Mexico that brought Santa Anna to power (whom the Texans allegedly supported). The author includes an excellent original source from Lucas Alaman, the Mexican Secretary of State in 1824, but absent a detailed discussion concerning the efforts by the United States to diplomatically obtain Texas (and the subsequent recommendation by its the first U.S. representative in Mexico, Joel Roberts Poinsett, to just allow illegal immigration from the U.S. to solve the problem for them), it lacks punch. Zavala gets a brief mention and is then absent from the rest of the chapter except for a ridiculously inaccurate picture attributed to him on page 168. FYI, Zavala was never a military officer nor did he ever sport facial hair, the image used was that of Pedro Jose de Zavala, a Spanish Peruvian Royalist officer who fought against Peruvian independence, which underscores the author's general ignorance of both geography, history and basic research skills.

The author ignores the complexity of issues that prompted both Tejanos and legal and illegal Anglo Texans to revolt against the Mexican government, as well as the conventions held in 1832 and 1833 to petition the Mexican government for reforms. Texas was part of the state of Coahuila and Texas, but many wanted Texas to be a separate state. This is one issue that was supported by many Tejanos and Anglo Texans. Anglo Texans wanted a repeal of the Law of April 6, 1830, so that people from the U.S. could once again legally immigrate to Texas, and a lifting or easing of custom duties to facilitate trade. There were even laudable resolutions advocating for the establishment of free public education. Stephen Austin left for Mexico City after the Convention of 1833 to present the petition to Mexican authorities. By this point, Tejano support for separate statehood had eroded, as they rightfully suspected long-term Anglo Texan intentions although some families like the Seguin, De Leon, Navarro and Ruiz sided with their Anglo neighbors. The stories of these families, four of the most prominent Tejano families who supported the Texas Revolution, and their subsequent role and treatment at the hands of their Anglo Texan compatriots are naturally completely absent from this narrative – a humorless piece of irony when one considers the alleged theme of this book.

The section concerning the Texas Revolution is an absolute disgrace and the author should rightly be embarrassed by its slipshod quality. The first phase of the war (1835) is given a slight treatment and does not even take the time to explain the evolution of the fighting into an all-out revolution. It certainly does not examine the deteriorating relations between the United States and Mexico as a result of the actions of the United States charge d'affaires, Col. Anthony Butler, who had speculative interests in Texas and involved himself in the internal politics of Mexico. The worst type of diplomat, his actions, which included bribe attempts in conjunction with his instructions to purchase Texas for the U.S., played a huge role. This certainly affected the Mexican government's willingness to listen to Texan petitions and to question their actual motives. The authors fail to discuss that the Mexican government had a legal right to label many of the people involved in the Texas Revolution as land pirates or filibusters, since many were in Texas illegally, thus giving them zero legal standing to either be in Texas or to engage in a war against the Mexican government. This is augmented by the author's failure to recognize that of

the 60 men who signed the Texas Declaration of Independence, only six enjoyed a legal right as either citizens or legal resident of Mexico to actually revolt against the central government. The vast majority of the signatories arrived after the Law of April 6, 1830, had passed and were thus living in Texas illegally. In addition, the authors do not understand the structure of that government as they incorrectly deduced that Houston's appointment as commander in chief of the Texan forces also meant he had been appointed president of the Texan government. That position was granted on an interim basis to David G. Burnet (with Lorenzo de Zavala serving as his Vice President).

Starting in 1836, the author is not aware that as Santa Anna was marching towards San Antonio, a second Mexican force under the command of General Jose de Urrea was sweeping up the Texas coast. This is important because the author similarly is unaware that Santa Anna was not present at the Battle of Coleto Creek (i.e. Goliad II). The author is also unaware that the distance between the Rio Grande and San Antonio requires more than a day to for an army of the 1830's to cross. The author is also unaware, that Santa Anna's troops arrived at San Antonio on February 23 and besieged the Alamo until the final attack that took place on the morning of March 6. The author is also unaware of basic vocabulary, as the word executed, in the context of a battle, would correctly be used for describing people who would had been captured or surrendered, disarmed and in a helpless state. The defenders of the Alamo were certainly well armed and they died almost to a man with the exception of the small number (about six) who were captured or surrendered... now those people were executed. In the case of Coleto Creek, the ill fate of those combatants was greatly influenced by the serious errors in judgement by the Anglo commander, James W. Fannin. The author incorrectly stated that Santa Anna led his troops in the battle. The only troops from the Alamo that participated in that battle were those of Col. Juan Morales, who led a 500-man detachment to reinforce Urrea's 350 men. The author states that 500 men were massacred at Goliad, while scholarly sources do not exceed 400. Sources indicate that Fannin did not have much more than 300 men with him at Coleto Creek and some of the soldiers captured in earlier engagement added to those killed, while others were spared for a variety of reasons.

The author starts the section leading to the Battle of San Jacinto by implying that Santa Anna and his army left Texas and then came back. This of course is untrue as his forces pursued the Texas Government and Houston's army in the direction of the Louisiana border. The author fails to mention that Santa Anna was especially keen to capture Lorenzo de Zavala, whom he regarded as a traitor. The authors fails to mention the Runaway Scrape. The author fails to note that Santa Anna was only leading about 20 percent of his effective forces at the Battle of San Jacinto (the actions of the other 80 percent are well documented and required some explanation). The author implies that Santa Anna had a legal right to cede territory, which he did not and by extension implies that the Mexican government had violated the treaty signed by Santa Anna. Even Houston knew that the treaty with Santa Anna was not legally binding, and hoped that Santa Anna would convince the rest of the Mexican government to accept the treaty. Finally, the

author's ignorance of historical geography is once again demonstrated as Texas was always drawn with the Nueces as its southern boundary. The land between the Rio Grande and the Nueces was properly part of the state of Tamaulipas.

The author commences the post-revolution section by squarely placing the blame for the Mexican American War on Mexican intransigence on accepting the independence of Texas. In essence the author whitewashed the very well documented agency of the United States in setting up the conditions for provoking that war. In addition, author fails to recognize the legal basis (Santa Anna did not legally have a right to grant Texas its independence) for which the Mexican government considered Texas a province in open rebellion rather than an independent nation. Important events like the Cordova Rebellion and the Cherokee War are completely absent from the narrative. This leads to one of the most egregious omissions in this text, and it deals with the treatment of both Tejanos and the Cherokee in the post war period. They talk about bad treatment for Tejanos as an aside, but are not willing to explore what actually happened and what that entailed. The fates of both the Seguin and De Leon families (two of the elite Tejano families who actually supported the Texas Revolution) are ignored and provide the blueprint to why relations between Anglos and Tejanos deteriorated by a combination of racism, greed and outright chicanery. The De Leon's endured murder, despoliation and exile all because Anglo settlers wanted their lands. The Cordova Rebellion was sparked due to this ill treatment and the fact that in the Texas Republic, those of Mexican decent suddenly became second-class citizens. The Cherokee War, which was tied to the Cordova Rebellion, was tied into the failure of Houston to enforce the promises he had made to the Cherokee, as Anglo settlers encroached upon their lands in Northeast Texas. What is notable, is that the authors attempt to blame the victim to justify mistreatment by suggesting that the behavior of some Tejanos and Cherokees justified general discrimination and despoliation against them. Erasmo Seguin, Antonio Menchaca, Francisco Antonio Ruiz, Jose Gregorio Esparza, the Flores brothers (Salvador and Manuel, founders of Floresville, Texas), Juana Navarro Alsbury, Placido Benavidez and Manuel Tarin are among the notable Mexican Americans of this era that fail to merit even a brief mention in this section.

The section dealing with the disorders within the Mexican government offers a way too simplistic overview of the changes of government. The changes in president number is essentially wrong (it was in reality, a little more than half that number) and denotes a misunderstanding. They should rather count associated administration rather than who effectively fronted the presidency (i.e., most of the time that Santa Anna was listed as president, in reality he had one of his confederates like Valentin Gomez Farias actually engaging in the day-to-day governance). The authors also suggests that monetary claims played a legitimate and primary reason for instigating the Mexican American War, when in actuality it was a pressure tactic used for political gain (the United States was fond of advancing dubious claims along with legitimate claims to inflate the monetary amounts that nations like Mexico owed and thus hold their economies hostage). The section on military action between Mexico and Texas between

1837 and 1845 is selective in its construction and fails to recognize that Mexico did not recognize Texan claims that their borders extended south and west to the Rio Grande. While the two Mexican expeditions to San Antonio are mentioned, the authors fail to note the Sommerville and Mier expeditions (which were Texan invasions of Mexican lands and further distort history by claiming that the Santa Fe Expedition was merely a trading mission. The authors use an insulting term (these petty crimes) to characterize the continued border disturbances and again label Mexicans as criminals and offer a further justification for future events. Authors also fail to mention that Texan leaders flirted with joining the British Union. The section closes with the United States presidential election of 1844 and proceeds to avoid examining James Polk's close relationship to Andrew Jackson and his ambitions for annexing Texas, which predate even the Texas Revolution. The authors add a laugh by ascribing the value of "freedom" to a southern slaveholder who was intent on using his presidency to increase the spread of slavery through territorial conquest.

The author in Section 2 of this chapter spends time breaking down the precedents for the Mexican American War. The most notable omission though is that there is zero discussion about the state of ethnic relations in Texas during the Texas Republic. Considering the formative importance of this era in setting the patterns of relations and cultural development of the Southwest, the absence of this in a book centered on Mexican American history is akin to ignoring a study of how slavery affected social relationships in the South. In other words, this war essentially creates the first Mexican Americans, so one would imagine that their reaction to being annexed to the United States (before the war for Tejanos and after the war everyone else in the Southwest) would be an important component of the section. In terms of causality, the idea that the Texas/Louisiana border was that grossly undefined between France and Spain in the is a load of malarkey and is used to advance the long discredited idea that the U.S. had legitimate claims to Texas because of the Louisiana Purchase. J. Q. Adams, who negotiated the cession of Florida knew it to be so and cynically used it as a bargaining chip in getting the Spanish to give up Florida. Adams coincidentally promised the Spanish that the U.S. would give up all claims to Texas if they yielded Florida.

The account of the Mexican American War is actually fairly well done and detailed. In this section, the author made a more concerted effort at some balance and analysis, and while there are some flaws, it is the only salvageable part of the two chapters I evaluated. The author details the three main campaigns (Northern Mexico/ Texas border, New Mexico/ California, and Scott's Veracruz landing and march upon Mexico City), which deserves some note as it is not uncommon for the New Mexico/ California campaigns to be conveniently minimized in most textbook accounts. This particular campaign is problematic for those who adhere to American exceptionalism since its very existence belied the notion that the United States was not engaging in a war of conscious territorial aggression. Still, there are some issues that the author needs to examine. First, the authors failed to acknowledge that while Kearney took New Mexico without a shot, the subsequent resistance was considerable as both the Mexican and Indigenous

inhabitants of New Mexico began to experience problems with the American authorities. Second, California's resistance was not that weak. While the battles in California were small in comparison to the ones in the rest of the war, the author should have noted that the Mexican Californians did not all submit passively. The author also did not notice nor inquire as to why Commodore Sloat attacked California in the summer of 1846. Sloat had orders in hand from Polk to invade California even before hostilities commenced. At the time it took many months (more than half a year) for a ship to travel from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast through Tierra del Fuego (i.e. southern tip of South America). This is an important point in discussing causality and preemptive intent on the part of Polk's government since Sloat's orders predated the start of hostilities and indicate that Polk had zero intention of avoiding a war with Mexico.

There are other elements that require greater emphasis on the part of the author. The author should have specified that Mexico's main disadvantage in defending itself is that only some of the states (essentially the ones in the line of the invasion) actually helped during the war. The disorganization and petty disputes between regional caudillos meant that the central Mexican government had a difficult time funding, arming and recruiting troops. While the author notes that the Catholic Church provided funds for Mexico's defense, they were for the most part forced to yield those funds as they were far from helpful and had a tendency to betray the Mexican nation every chance they got. The author inserted an erroneous image for General Winfield Scott. The image that is used is a Civil War era image of General Winfield Scott Hancock (no relation to Gen. Scott). The map of the Mexican American War shades Northwestern Mexico (I.e. New Mexico and California) a different color from Mexico, distorting their status as part of the territory of Mexico. The author provided good details in regards to the Battle of El Molino del Rey but some of the other battles should have received similar detail. Again, I must cite the misuse of the word massacre in describing the tremendous casualties United States forces took in the battle. Those American troops were mishandled on a fairly foolish frontal assault against a strongly fortified point, which cost the lives of more than a hundred troops and many times more wounded. Their eventual success came courtesy of the death of the Mexican commander and Mexican soldiers running out of munitions. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo merited a much deeper discussion (and in my opinion should have been one of the Original Source documents they should have spotlighted) since its provisions (and subsequent American violations) set the patterns for relations between Anglos and Mexican Americans.

There are two final critiques. The first is the idea that Mexicans looked forward to reconquering their lost territory. The Reconquista thing is highly overstated. I can think of no serious or powerful Mexican political figure of the post-war era who seriously entertained the possibility of such an action. Finally, the author added a statement in reference to those Mexicans who were now incorporated into the United States after the war that deserves to be challenged: "Although some faced discrimination, many now had freedom and could begin to benefit themselves economically." Any reasonable historian would argue that very few of these new Mexican

Americans experienced either an enhancement of their political or economic freedoms as part of the United States. The average Mexican American experienced a degradation of their political power through a combination of legal maneuvers, economic swindles and even local and state sponsored violence that quickly made them second-class citizens in their own homes. Even the few elite Mexican families in the region were not immune to such pressures and usually if there was any political or economic parity it was in regions in which they managed to hold a significant population majority to counteract the swell of Anglo American settlers.